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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Morgan Christopher Alley appeals from his conviction for manufacture and 
delivery of synthetic marijuana. Specifically, he asserts that the particular 
chemical composition of one of the active ingredients, called AM-2201, in the 
synthetic marijuana he produced and sold was not covered by Schedule I. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
A grand jury indicted Alley for conspiracy to manufacture, deliver or 
possess with intent to deliver tetrahydrocannabinols (sometimes called 'THC") or 
synthetic equivalents between March 2011 and September 2011, conspiracy to 
deliver or possess with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia, unlawful possession 
of a firearm, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of 
paraphernalia, with an enhancement for repeat violations of the controlled 
substance laws. (R., pp. 32-36, 58-59.) Alley moved to dismiss the charges on 
the basis that the substance he was accused of making or delivering, called 
"spice" or "potpourri," was not a controlled substance under the law existing at 
the time of the allegedly criminal acts or, alternatively, that the statute did not 
provide sufficient notice that his actions were illegal. (R., pp. 79-176.) The state 
opposed the motion. (R., p. 201-59.) The district court denied the motion. (R., 
pp. 297-316.) The district court also denied a motion to reconsider. (R., pp. 334-
63, 367-77, 379.) 
Alley ultimately pied guilty to manufacturing and delivery of a controlled 
substance and possession with intent to deliver paraphernalia and the 
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enhancement, preserving the "right to review on appeal of [the District] Court's 
Decision denying his MOTION TO DISMISS and the [District] Court's denial of 
his MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of such decision." (R., pp. 446-51.) 
The district court imposed concurrent sentences of 10 years with two years fixed. 
(R., p. 482-84.) Alley filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 487-89.) 
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ISSUES 
Alley's statement of the issues on appeal is found on pages 8 and 9 of his 
brief and is not repeated here. The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Alley failed to show error in the district court's determination that AM-
2201 was a controlled substance under Schedule I of the Idaho Uniform 
Controlled Substances Act as it existed at the time? 
2. Has Alley failed to show error in the district court's determination that the 





Alley Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That AM-
2201 Was A Controlled Substance Under Schedule I Of The Idaho Uniform 
Controlled Substances Act As It Existed At The Time 
A. Introduction 
The synthetic marijuana Alley was manufacturing and selling contained 
three different forms of synthetic THC (depending on the sample): AM-2201, 
JWM-019, and JWM-210. (R., p. 298.) Although Alley did not contest the latter 
two ingredients being controlled substances, he did contend AM-2201 was not.1 
(R., p. 298.) Specifically, he argued that because the statutory definition of 
synthetic tetrahydrocannabinol referenced "substitution at the nitrogen atom of 
the indole ring by alkyl," and because AM-2201 has a substitution at the nitrogen 
atom of the indole ring by an "alkyl halide" (because of the presence of a fluorine 
atom), AM-2201 did not fall within schedule I. (R., pp. 299-305. See also R., p. 
307 (recognizing that Alley's argument rises from the chemical difference of "a 
fluoride atom rather than a hydrogen atom at the end of the carbon chain 
attached to the nitrogen atom on the indole").) 
The district court began its analysis "with the literal words of the statute" 
(R., p. 300) and concluded the defendant's argument trying to distinguish AM-
2201 from the example of synthetic THC in the statute "misses the point" 
1 Because Alley was properly charged with (and is guilty of) manufacturing and 
delivering synthetic marijuana containing JWM-019 and JWM-210, which he 
admits are controlled substances within the scope of Schedule I, his motion to 
dismiss could have been denied on this basis alone. His challenge on appeal to 
whether AM-2201 is also within Schedule I is thus moot. State v. Barclay, 149 
Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010). 
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because it is derived from "reading a select portion [of the statute] rather than 
reading it as a whole" (R., p. 305).2 The statute in question, Schedule I of the 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act, includes five subsections dealing with 
different types of substances, including "[h]allucinogenic substances." (R., pp. 
305-06.) One subset of controlled hallucinogenic substances was 
"[t]etrahyrdocannibinols or synthetic equivalents . . . with similar chemical 
structure" to tetrahydrocannabinols "such as ... the following synthetic drugs." 
(R., pp. 306.) Thus, whether the defense was correct, and "AM-2201 is not 
derived 'by substitution ... by alkyl,"' was not significant because by using the 
phrase "such as" "the legislature intended to include [AM-2201] and substances 
like it in Schedule I." (R., p. 307.) Such a reading of the statute was also 
supported by its legislative history, including the legislative statement of purpose. 
(R., p. 307.) The district court concluded: 
The Court finds that the Idaho legislature unambiguously 
intended to add synthetic imitators of marijuana to Schedule I and it 
did so in broad language that encompasses AM-2201. The 
contrary conclusion is reached only by ignoring the portion of the 
statute which indicates the specific formulations are given by way of 
example. It was the intent of the legislature to not deal with the so-
called 'spice' problem by constantly amending the statute as new 
analogs for THC are developed or discovered in the scientific 
literature by purveyors of mind altering substances. 
(R., p. 308.) 
Alley first argues the district court erred by "resorting to legislative history 
first, and then using that legislative history to conclude that the unambiguous 
2 A copy of the district court's written opinion (R., pp. 297-316) is attached to this 
brief as an appendix. 
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language of the statute prohibited AM-2201." (Appellant's brief, p. 10.) This 
argument fails because a plain reading of the district court's opinion shows it 
relied upon the plain language of the statute to make its decision and only cited 
legislative history as consistent with its conclusion about the plain language. 
Alley next argues that the chemical composition of AM-2201 and the 
chemical formulations specified in the statute are sufficiently different to bring 
AM-2201 outside the scope of Schedule I. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-18.) 
Specifically, he claims he presented evidence that AM-2201 is in a different 
chemical "class" than those listed in the statute. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-16.) 
This argument overstates the evidence he presented and fails to show error in 
the district court's analysis of that evidence. He also claims that by listing as 
potential substitutions at the nitrogen atom only chemical chains made up of 
carbon and hydrogen atoms the legislature meant to exclude carbon chains with 
other atoms, such as fluorine atoms. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-18.) This reading 
of the statute is unsupported by its plain language. 
Application of the correct legal standard, as was done by the district court, 
shows that the plain language of the statute included synthetic THC such as AM-
2201 within Schedule I. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405, 
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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C. The District Court Correctly Applied The Plain Language Of The Statute 
"When interpreting statutes we begin with the literal words of the statute, 
which are the best guide to determining legislative intent." Leavitt v. Craven,_ 
Idaho _, _ P.3d _, 2012 WL 2053762 at *5 (2012) (internal quotes, 
brackets and citation omitted). If the plain language of the statute is 
unambiguous, "legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be 
consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the 
legislature." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 
893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011). In this case the statutory language plainly 
expresses legislative intent to ban all synthetic THC. 
The statute in question, l.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) (2011)3, included in 
Schedule I, as hallucinogenic controlled substances, tetrahydrocannabinols or 
synthetic equivalents and "synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers 
with similar chemical structure such as ... [a]ny compound structurally derived 
from 3-(1-naphthoyl)indole or 1 H-indol-3-yl-(1-naphthyl)methane by substitution 
at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl .... " l.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) 
(2011). In this case there is no dispute that AM-2201 meets all the terms of this 
statute ("synthetic substance," "similar chemical structure" to 
tetrahydrocannabinol, "derived from 3-(1-naphthoyl)indole or 1 H-indol-3-yl-(1-
naphthyl)methane by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring") except 
3 The 2011 amendment was in effect at the times relevant to this case. 2011 
Idaho Session Laws, ch. 47, § 1, p. 109. A 2012 amendment is currently in 
effect. l.C. § 37-2705(d)(31) (Supp. 2012). 
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whether the substitution is by "alkyl." (R., pp. 300-08.) Alley's contention is that 
there is no "substitution . . . by alkyl" because the "substitution at the nitrogen 
atom of the indole ring" is by alkyl halide, which is different from the alkyl group 
because it has a fluorine atom. (R., pp. 300-08.) The district court properly 
concluded that Schedule I included all synthetic THC, and therefore the chemical 
distinction claimed by Alley, which was not claimed to render AM-2201 
something other than a synthetic THC, did not remove AM-2201 from Schedule I. 
As determined by the district court, the language of the statute that 
"synthetic substances ... with similar chemical structure" to THC "such as" the 
formulations found in subsection ii, plainly states that the formulations are 
representative and not exclusive. (R., pp. 300-08.) Thus, the difference of one 
atom (fluorine instead of hydrogen) between AM-2201 and the chemical 
formulation given as representative of synthetic THC did not render AM-2201 
outside the scope of the statute making illegal synthetic substances with similar 
chemical structure to THC part of Schedule 1.4 
Alley first argues the district court reached its decision "by resorting to 
legislative history." (Appellant's brief, p. 10.) This argument is apparently based 
on the assumption that "plain language" analysis and determination of legislative 
intent are mutually exclusive. (Id.) Besides being illogical, the argument that 
4 The state on appeal, as in the trial court, contends that AM-2201 is in fact within 
the representative formulation provided in l.C. § 37-2705( d)(30)(ii)(a) (2011 ). 
(See, ~. R., p. 303.) However, because the district court did not resolve the 
issue on this basis, but instead correctly held that the chemical formulations in 
the statute are merely representative and the real question is whether the 
synthetic has "similar chemical structure" to THC, this issue is not before this 
Court for resolution. 
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legislative intent is not gleaned from the language used in a statute is without 
basis in law. Leavitt, 2012 WL 2053762 at *5 ("When interpreting statutes we 
begin with the literal words of the statute, which are the best guide to determining 
legislative intent." (internal quotes, brackets and citation omitted)); Verska, 151 
Idaho at 893, 265 P.3d at 506 (plain language of a statute is the "intent of the 
legislature"). The district court clearly relied on the plain language of the statute 
to determine that AM-2201 is within the scope of Schedule I, and referenced 
legislative history only as ultimately supporting the conclusion already reached 
under the plain language analysis. (Compare R., pp. 300-07 (plain language 
analysis) with R., p. 307-08 (mentioning legislative statement of purpose and 
committee minutes only after reaching conclusion based on analysis of the 
language of statute).) Alley's argument is unsupported by the record. 
Alley also argues that the district court should have "account[ed] for the 
legislature's actions in removing references to pharmacological effects and 
extreme focus on structure." (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-12.) However, it is the 
plain language of the statute that controls, and that plain language brings 
synthetic marijuana with "similar chemical structure" to THC (such as AM-2201) 
within the prohibition of Schedule I, not just the chemical formulations 
enumerated after the phrase "such as." (R., pp. 300-08.) Even if this Court were 
to consider the proffer of extrinsic evidence of legislative intent it does not show 
error. Before the amendment a synthetic marijuana was within the scope of 
Schedule I only if it had both "similar chemical structure and pharmacological 
activity" of THC. See 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 47, § 1, p. 111 (emphasis 
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added). The amendment eliminated the element of "pharmacological activity." 
Id. That the state had one less element to prove did not narrow the statute, as 
apparently claimed by Alley; it in fact broadened it. The elimination of this portion 
of the statute in no way informs the inquiry into whether AM-2201 is within the 
scope of Schedule I. 
Alley next argues that the district court should have accepted his expert's 
testimony that AM-2201 "is in a different 'class"' than the compounds listed in 
subsection (ii)(a). (Appellant's brief, pp. 16.) Alley has failed to show that this 
testimony demonstrates any error by the district court. 
Dr. McDougal testified about a "portion of the molecule," specifically, a 
"five-carbon chain" located "off the nitrogen ring." (Tr., p. 39, Ls. 4-8.) Because 
that chain ended with a "halogen fluorine atom" the chain was "an alkyl halide" 
and not an "alkyl group," which is composed only of "carbon and hydrogen." (Tr., 
p. 39, Ls. 6-24.) Once an atom such as the halogen fluorine is added the 
compound is removed from the "alkyl group" and it "becomes a different class of 
compound." (Tr., p. 39, L. 23 - p. 41, L. 23.) The district court specifically 
considered this testimony. (R., p. 303.) The court first rejected the testimony by 
noting that the legislature did not use the phrase "alkyl halide" or "alkyl group" but 
just "alky." (R., p. 304). Focusing on whether the carbon chain at issue was an 
"alkyl halide" or "alkyl group" "ignor[es] the language chosen by the legislature." 
(R., p. 304.) The district court also rejected Dr. McDougal's testimony 
distinguishing alkyl halides from alkyl groups because it related only to "a select 
portion" of the statute "rather than reading it as a whole." (R., p. 305.) 
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Ultimately, because AM-2201 is a synthetic THC it fell within Schedule I. (R., pp. 
305-08.) 
Alley has failed to show error. Dr. McDougal did not testify that AM-2201 
was in a different "class" than synthetic substances with similar chemical 
structure as THC (the relevant part of the statute as determined by the district 
court). He testified that a part of the atom, a carbon chain, was an "alkyl halide" 
and not an "alkyl group" and assumed that the legislative use of the word "alkyl" 
meant to include the latter and exclude the former. The district court properly 
rejected the argument that this testimony demonstrated that AM-2201 fell outside 
the proscription of synthetic THC in Schedule I. 
Alley next argues that the examples of synthetic drugs in subsection (ii)(a) 
contain only chains of carbon and hydrogen, and therefore any synthetic drug 
with an atom other than carbon or hydrogen must be excluded as inconsistent 
with the examples. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-18.) The district court concluded 
this argument "misses the point" because it, again, looks at only a very limited 
part of the statute. (R., p. 305.) Alley's argument would essentially make the list 
exclusive, when the plain language shows the opposite intent (R., pp. 305-08), 
and even Alley acknowledges that the list is "non-exhaustive" (Appellant's brief, 
p. 13). 
Finally, Alley invokes the rule of lenity. (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-19.) 
"[T]he rule of lenity only applies if, after considering text, structure, history, and 
purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such 
that the Court must simply guess as to what [the legislature] intended." Barber v. 
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Thomas,_ U.S._, 130 S.Ct. 2499, 2508-09 (2010) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). The mere "grammatical possibility of a defendant's 
interpretation does not command a resort to the rule of lenity if the interpretation 
proffered by the defendant reflects an implausible reading of the [legislative] 
purpose." Abbott v. United States,_ U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 18, 31 n.9 (2010) 
(internal quotations omitted). Alley has failed to show any ambiguity in the 
statute, much less an ambiguity rising to the level of requiring application of the 
rule of lenity. 
The district court engaged in a thorough, thoughtful and correct analysis of 
the plain language of the statute and concluded that AM-2201 was within the 
scope of Schedule I. Even accepting the defense claim that AM-2201 is one 
atom different than the representative chemical formulation in subsection (ii)(a), 
such does not show that AM-2201 is not a "synthetic substance" with "similar 
chemical structure" to THC "such as" the chemical formulations provided in the 
statute. The district court correctly concluded that the plain language of the 
statute did not provide the chemical formulations as an exclusive list but instead 
as representative of the types of chemical formulations of synthetic marijuana 
prohibited. (R., pp. 300-08.) The plain language of the statute prohibited the 
synthetic THC known as AM-2201. 
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11. 
Alley Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That The 
Relevant Portion Of Schedule I ls Not Unconstitutionally Vague As Applied To 
Him 
A. Introduction 
The district court concluded that l.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) (2011) plainly 
banned "synthetic cannabinoids," and therefore Alley's belief that AM-2201 
(clearly a synthetic THC compound) did not fall under the specific chemical 
examples provided in l.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) (2011) did not demonstrate lack 
of notice that AM-2201 was a controlled substance. (R., pp. 313-16.) Alley 
claims that the statute was sufficiently vague that he lacked notice that AM-2201 
was a controlled substance, primarily because it is debatable whether AM-2201 
falls within the specific chemical examples provided in l.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) 
(2011 ). Alley has failed to show error because, whether or not the single fluorine 
atom distinguished AM-2201 from the chemical formulae in subsection (ii)(a), it 
was a banned synthetic THC, and the fact that it was synthetic THC was the very 
reason that Alley possessed and sold it. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The construction and application of a statute are questions of law over 
which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Locke, 149 Idaho 641, 
642, 239 P.3d 34, 35 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 
80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003)); State v. Scott, 135 Idaho 457, 458-59, 19 
P.3d 771, 772-73 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Pusey, 128 Idaho 647, 648, 917 P.2d 
804, 805 (Ct. App. 1996). The constitutionality of a statute is likewise a question 
13 
of law over which the appellate court exercises free review. Doe I v. Doe, 138 
Idaho 893, 903, 71 P .3d 1040, 1050 (2003). 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Statute Gave Notice That 
All Synthetic THC, Not Just The Formulations In The Examples In The 
Statute, Were Banned 
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as 
applied to a defendant's conduct. To succeed on an "as applied" vagueness 
challenge, a complainant must show that the statute, as applied to his conduct, 
(1) fails to provide fair notice that his conduct was proscribed, or (2) fails to 
provide sufficient guidelines to prevent arbitrary enforcement. State v. Korsen, 
138 Idaho 706, 712, 69 P.3d 126, 132 (2003). "It has long been held that a 
statute should not be held void for uncertainty if any practical interpretation can 
be given the statute." State v. Larsen, 135 Idaho 754, 756, 24 P.3d 702, 704 
(2001). "To succeed on an 'as applied' vagueness challenge, a complainant 
must show that the statute failed to provide fair notice that the complainant's 
specific conduct was prohibited or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that 
police had unbridled discretion in determining whether to charge the 
complainant." Williams v. State, 153 Idaho 380, 390, 283 P.3d 127, 137 (Ct. 
App. 2012). 
For the reasons stated above, and by the district court (R., pp. 300-08), 
the plain language of the statute banned all synthetic THC with the language that 
"synthetic equivalents" of THC and "synthetic substances ... with similar chemical 
structure" were banned. See l.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) (2011). Alley argues that 
because experts concluded that AM-2201 was not included in the example of 
14 
what types of synthetic substances were at issue (under the language "such as") 
he lacked notice that AM-2201 was a controlled substance. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 21-22.) The district court properly rejected this argument as focused on only 
a portion of the statute. Read in its entirety the language was plain that synthetic 
THC was banned. 
Alley next argues that a subsequent amendment "to clarify and correct for 
the confusion created by the initial language in the statute" shows lack of notice. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 22-23.) Even assuming that the later amendment did 
clarify the statute, Alley has cited no law nor presented any logical reason why 
this would be relevant to the question of what notice he in fact had. Alley 
certainly was not prospectively relying on the amendment. 
Finally, Alley claims he "made a good faith effort to comply with Idaho 
law." (Appellant's brief, pp. 23-24.) From the state's perspective Alley attempted 
to exploit what he believed was a loophole to sell what he knew was synthetic 
marijuana, but unfortunately for him he decided to consider only a small portion 
of the relevant statute. In addition, Alley's claim of "good faith" is seriously 
undercut by the fact he was also selling two other forms of synthetic THC that he 
acknowledges were controlled substances. Even assuming the relevance of 
"good faith," there is none in this case. 
When the language of the entire statute dealing with synthetic THC is 
considered it is plain that the legislature included all synthetic THC in Schedule I. 
That AM-2201 is a formulation of synthetic THC that Alley believed was arguably 
15 
outside the scope of the "such as" example of synthetic THC in the statute did 
not deprive Alley of reasonable notice that AM-2201 was a controlled substance. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
judgment of conviction. 
DATED this 30th day of May, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of May, 2013, I caused two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
RYAN L. HOLDAWAY 
Pitcher & Holdaway 
40 W Cache Valley Blvd, Ste 3B 
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DECISION AND ORDER RE: 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
This decision is entered to correct the caption to reflect the participation of Hieu Ngoc 
Phan ("Phan") in the motion. 
BACKGROUND 
Defendant Morgan Alley has moved to dismiss the Indictment in this case. The motion 
does not state the legal basis for requesting dismissal, but it is clear from the briefing and 
arguments of counsel at the hearing that Defendant is alleging the Indictment does not state a 
crime. He does not challenge the specificity of the Indictment or claim it does not put him on 
notice of the crime charged. The factual basis for his motion is the claim that the substance AM-
2201 is not illegal. In the alternative, Defendant argues that the Idaho Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the Defendants in this case because of 
the asserted ambiguity regarding AM-2201. He is joined in the motion by co-defendants Tashina 




























Alley, Goggin, and Phan, but those defendants did not actively participate by the filing of briefs 
or examining witnesses at the hearing on this matter. This opinion will focus on the case against 
Mr. Alley while recognizing that these are consolidated cases and the ruling will apply to the co-
defendants joining in the motion to the extent the charges against them are the same as those 
against Mr. Alley. All Defendants have been charged with, among other things, conspiracy to 
manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to deliver, a Schedule I controlled substance in 
violation of 37-2732(a), 18-1701, and 37-2732(f). The conspiracy count of the Indictment does 
not further define the particular substance that was manufactured or possessed. Mr. Alley is also 
charged with illegal possession of a Schedule I controlled substance in violation of37-2732(c). 
Ms. Goggin is charged with illegal delivery of a Schedule I controlled substance in violation of 
37-2732(a). The illegal possession count against Mr. Alley simply specifies "marijuana and/or 
synthetic cannabinols." The illegal delivery count against Ms. Alley says a Schedule I drug 
without further specification. However, the record includes the State forensics laboratory report 
of the controlled substance analysis. The report reflects the presence of 3 substances identified 
by the Forensic Scientist as being Schedule I substances-AM-2201, JWM-019, and JWM-210. 
The essential argument by Mr. Alley is that AM-2201 is not a Schedule I substance. 
Specifically, It is conceded by Defendants that the other two substances are within the definition 
of LC.§ 37-2705(d). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Is the substance identified as AM-2201 a controlled substance as defined in 
Schedule I of the Idaho Uniform Controlled Substances Act? 
2. Is I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii) unconstitutionally vague with respect to AM-2201, 




























JWM-019, and JWM-210 as applied to the Defendants in this case? 
DISCUSSION 
I. Is AM-2201 a Controlled Substance? Schedule I substances are defined in 
Idaho Code §37-2705. Subsection (a) provides: "The controlled substances listed in this section 
are included in schedule I." Subsections (b) and (c) list opiates and opium derivatives. 
Subsection (d) lists hallucinogenic substances, including marijuana. 
The substance AM-2201 is a synthetic compound invented by researchers at the 
University of Connecticut. It is not named in the Controlled Substance Act. The name is derived 
from the initials of the inventor and conveys nothing about the nature of the substance itself. The 
state maintains AM-2201 is described by LC. §37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a). That section provides: 
( d) Hallucinogenic substances. Any material, compound, mixture or preparation 
which contains any quantity of the following hallucinogenic substances, their 
salts, isomers and salts of isomers, unless specifically excepted, whenever the 
existence of these salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the 
specific chemical designation (for purposes of this paragraph only, the term 
"isomer" includes the optical, position and geometric isomers): 
(30) Tetrahydrocannabinols or synthetic equivalents of the substances contained 
in the plant, or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic 
substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure such as 
the following: 
ii. The following synthetic drugs: 
a. Any compound structurally derived from 3-(1-naphthoyl) indole or IH-
indol-3- yl-(1-naphthyl)methane by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole 
ring by alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyl, cycloalkylethyl or 2-( 4-
morpholinyl)ethyl, whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any 
extent, whether or not substituted in the naphthyl ring to any extent. 
Rather than name a specific substance, §37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) describes groups of similar, but 




























not chemically identical, substances. The parties pose the question then, as whether AM-2201 
falls within the compounds described by §37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a). As discussed below, the proper 
inquiry is the legislative intent in amending the statue. 
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. The words 
must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute must be construed as a 
whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, the court does not construe it, but simply follows the law 
as written. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003) (citations omitted). 
"We have consistently held that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and 
other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed 
intent of the legislature." Verska v. St. A/phonsus Reg'/ Med Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 
502, 506 (2011) (citing City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851P.2d961, 
963 (1993). A court must construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections of applicable 
statutes together to determine the intent of the legislature. It is incumbent upon the court to give 
the statute an interpretation that will not deprive it of its potency. Hillside Landscape Const., 
Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 151 Idaho 749, 264 P.3d 388 (2011). In determining the ordinary 
meaning of a statute effect must be given to all the words of the statute if possible, so that none 
will be void, superfluous, or redundant. Id. (quoting State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 
P.3d 308, 309 (2006)). 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress there was no dispute that the applicable statute 
describes compounds with a common parent structure a portion of which is composed of an 




























indole ring. 1 This is represented in State's Exhibit 101: 
Ntphthoyllndole (ldoho Code 37-270S(d)30.K.•l 
The indole is the portion of the compound represented below: 
h-ll 
~N). 
N represents a nitrogen atom. R 1 in the first diagram represents a chain of atoms attached to the 
nitrogen atom. This chain of atoms is called a substituent. Specifically, the substituent here is a 
chain containing carbon and hydrogen atoms. This much is agreed upon. The controversy is 
over whether the chain attached to the nitrogen atom can contain an element other than carbon 
and hydrogen and still fit within the definition of the statute. 
AM-2201 is represented structurally as: 
1 What follows here is the Court's best effort to interpret submissions of the parties, including the testimony. This 
judge is not an organic chemist and the discussion may not be completely accurate so far as the chemistry is 
concerned, but the Court concludes this ultimately is not controlling. 









For the non-chemist, these representations are somewhat problematical in that some 
7 
information contained in the diagrams is implied rather than explicit. For example, in organic 
8 
9 
chemistry, when illustrating the structural formula for hydrocarbons, each unlabeled vertex2 and 
10 unattached endpoint represents a carbon atom. Carbon has 4 valence bonds. Absent notation 
11 otherwise, it is assumed a hydrogen atom is present wherever a bond is available.3 A double line 
12 represents a double bond between adjacent atoms. 
13 
The portion of the AM-2201 diagram from the N to the Fis the heart of the dispute here 
14 
and the focus of the evidence and arguments at the hearing on the motion. In particular the 
15 
parties dispute the meaning of"by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl ... " 
16 
17 




2 Used in the mathematical sense of"the point where two sides ofa plane figure or an angle intersect." 
21 3 For example, the written formula for butane is C4H10. The structural formula is shown below along with the 
skeletal structural formula generally used by chemists and as represented in the exhibits in this case. All three 
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Butane is also known as n-Butane, Diethyl, Butyl hydride, and Methylethylmethane. Source: National Center for 
Biotechnology Information website accessed at htt,P://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/summruy/swnmary.cgi?cid=7843> 




























IUP AC4 nomenclature to explain the statute in question. A hydrocarbon is a compound 
composed only of carbon and hydrogen atoms. Alkanes are acyclic (chain structure) 
hydrocarbons having the general formula CnH2n+2, and therefore consisting entirely of hydrogen 
atoms and saturated carbon atoms. Alkyl groups are univalent groups derived from alkanes by 
removal of a hydrogen atom from any carbon atom: CnH2n+1-. The groups derived by removal of 
a hydrogen atom from a terminal carbon atom of unbranched alkanes form a subclass of normal 
alkyl (n-alkyl) group~. Alkyl radicals are carbon-centered radicals derived formally by removal 
of one hydrogen atom from an alkane. The court could not locate, and the parties did not cite, a 
stand-alone definition of alkyl. 
Defendant's witnesses testified that AM-2201 is not within the scope of the statute. Dr. 
McDougal based his conclusion on the structure of the substituent being an alkyl halide rather 
than an alkyl group. That is, the presence of the fluoride atom at the terminus of the carbon chain 
prevents the compound being characterized as an alkyl group. He contrasts this with the 
structure of JWH-018 that has a simple 5 carbon chain attached at the nitrogen atom on the 
indole ring. Dr. De Jesus essentially says the same thing, only he labels the substituent a fluro-
substituted alkyl group. By contrast, Mr. Sincerbeaux testified that it is the removal of the 
hydrogen atom from the alkane that renders the resulting compound an alkyl group. In his view, 
it matters not what replaces the missing hydrogen atom.5 The contrasting views can be 
4 International Union Of Pure And Applied Chemistry; A Guide to !UPAC Nomenclature of Organic Compounds 
(Recommendations 1993), 1993, Blackwell Scientific publications. Accessed commencing at 
http://www.chem.qmul.ac.uk/iupac/class/ and /UPAC Nomenclature of Organic Chemistry. Accessed commencing 
at http://www.iupac.org/fileadmin/the-network/index.html. 
5 Mr. Sincerbeaux also testifies extensively concerning his involvement in the drafting of the statute and what he and 
the others sponsoring the legislation intended. Mr. Sincerbeaux and his colleagues are not legislators. Nor is it 
apparent from the legislative history that the lawmakers adopted the sponsor's reasoning along with the proposed 




























illustrated as follows: 
N-( CHi-C H2-C H2-C H2-C H2F) represents the interpretation of the 
statute by the professors. N-( CH2-C H2-C H2-C H2 )-CH2F represents 
the view espoused by the state's forensic scientist. In other words, the state treats 
the carbon chain with the first 4 carbons as the spine and the final compound 
(CH2F) as a substituent. 
As stated by Dr. De Jesus, the Idaho legislature is not a body of chemists. The issue is 
what did the legislature intend to add to Schedule I? The legislature did not use the term "alkyl 
group" or "alkyl radical." It used the phrase "any compound structurally derived from [certain 
named chemicals] by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl. .. " The 
legislature was not engaged in naming the resulting chemical compound, which is the point of 
much of the testimony regarding the IUP AC rules for nomenclature. If naming the resulting 
chemical compound was the purpose of the legislature, it is obvious that neither AM-2201 nor 
JWH-018 would be derived as names. Those are the names of the compounds discussed by 
Defendants' experts, both of whom opine that JWH-018 comes within the prohibition of the 
statute. 
The parties, by focusing on the correct name for the portion of the compound represented 
by the chain attached at the nitrogen atom are ignoring the language chosen by the legislature. It 
appears undisputed from the testimony that the AM-2201 is derived from 3-(1-naphthoyl)indole 
and that derivation happens by substitution at the nitrogen atom by alkyl halide. In organic 
chemistry, substitution refers to a reaction process. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, a 
substitution reaction is "any of a class of chemical reactions in which an atom, ion, or group of 
language in the bill that ultimately became J.C. §37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a). Consequently, this is not part of the 
legislative history and sheds little light on the intent of the legislature. 




























atoms or ions in a molecule is replaced by another atom, ion, or group.6 Wikipedia says "in a 
substitution reaction, a functional group in a particular chemical compound is replaced by 
another group. 7 Depending on which definition is chosen, the words "by substitution ... by 
alkyl" could restrict the meaning of the phrase to mean that the prohibited substance may only be 
derived using an alkyl functional group, or it may mean that "a group of atoms or ions" 
containing only hydrocarbons with a missing hydrogen atom is part of the process by which the 
substance is created. This type of analysis misses the point. 
The Defendants and their experts derive their interpretation of the statute by reading a 
select portion rather than reading it as a whole. To properly glean the meaning of the statute, one 
has to read the statute as a whole, commencing with the listing of compounds that are defined in 
Schedule I. In this instance the beginning point is LC. §37-2705(a). This informs the reader that 
Schedule I drugs are those listed in "this section"-meaning the entirety of §37-2705. There 
follows 5 subsections listing various types of substances. Subsection (b) deals with opiates; 
subsection ( c) deals with opium derivatives; subsection ( d) deals with hallucinogenic substances; 
6 Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s. v. "substitution reaction," accessed April 03, 2012, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/571075/substitution-reaction 
See, also, Illustrated Glossary of Organic Chemistry, which defines substitution reaction as "a reaction in which any 
part of a molecule is replaced (substituted). Harding, Illustrated Glossary of Organic Chemistry, UCLA < 
http:!lwww.chem.uc/a.edu/harding/IGOCIS!substitution reaction.html>; accessed April 03, 2012. 
7 httP://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substitution reaction; accessed April 03, 2012. To the amazement of the Court, the 
defendants' scientific experts both cite Wikipedia in their written submissions. Wikipedia may be a common source 
of information, but given its editorial policies, the Court hardly views it as an authoritative source. While any given 
article may be completely accurate, it is not possible for one not familiar with the topic of the article to tell the 
accurate from the false. From Wikipedia itself: 
Wikipedia is written collaboratively by largely anonymous Internet volunteers who write without 
pay. Anyone with Internet access can write and make changes to Wikipedia articles (except in 
certain cases where editing is restricted to prevent disruption or vandalism). Users can contribute 
anonymously, under a pseudonym, or with their real identity, if they choose. 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About >accessed April 03, 2012 (emphasis added). 




























subsection (e) deals with central nervous system depressants; and subsection (f) deals with 
stimulants. We are concerned here with subsection (d): 
(d) Hallucinogenic substances. Any material, compound, mixture or preparation 
which contains any quantity of the following hallucinogenic substances [their 
salts, isomers, etc.]: 
Subsection (d) has 35 sub-subsections. The first 29 are substances from 4-bromo-2,5-
dimethoxy amphetamine to marijuana, to peyote, to psilocin. The last 5 also list specific 
substances. Sub-subsection (30) does not list a specific substance, but a description of types of 
substances: 
(30) Tetrahydrocannabinols or synthetic equivalents of the substances contained 
in the plant, or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic 
substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure such as 
the following: 
Sub-subsection (30) has two sub-sub-subsections. Sub-sub-subsection (i) is titled 
"Tetrahydrocannabinols" and has a lettered list of 4 specific substances. We are concerned with 
Sub-sub-subsection (ii). It is titled "The following synthetic drugs:" and contains lettered sub-
sub-sub-sections (a) through (i). 
By stripping the statute down to the component parts to be construed it is fairly easy to 
discern the intention of the legislature: 
37-2705. Schedule I. 
(a) The controlled substances listed in this section are included in schedule I. 
( d) Hallucinogenic substances. 
(30) synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant, or in 
the resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, 
and their isomers with similar chemical structure such as ... 
ii. The following synthetic drugs: 
[list]. 




























"Cannabis, sp". is marijuana. The psychoactive substance in marijuana is Tetrahydrocannabinol 
or THC. " ... and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical 
structure" is referring to synthetic marijuana or synthetic substances that mimic the 
hallucinogenic properties of marijuana. Use of the words "such as" by the legislature means the 
list is not exclusive. It could as well read "for example." Whether the Defendants are correct 
that AM-2201 is not derived "by substitution ... by alkyl," or the state is correct in its view to the 
contrary, it is clear the legislature intended to include it and substances like it in Schedule I. The 
legislative statement of purpose provides: 
The purpose of the legislation is to create safe regulations for the public 
concerning tetrahydrocannabinols from synthetic drugs (Spice) that mimic the 
effects of Cannabis and identifying additional substances to be classified in 
schedule I. 8 
The chemical structure of AM-2201, if not exactly described in I.C. §37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a), is 
certainly similar. The difference amounts to the presence of a fluoride atom rather than a 
hydrogen atom at the end of the carbon chain attached to the nitrogen atom on the indole. Dr. 
McDougal makes this point with his diagrams on his letter dated 6 January 2012 [sic].9 Dr. De 
Jesus makes the point with his discussion alternative language that could have been used by the 
legislature. He suggests that it should have simply left out the words "by alkyl, alkenyl, 
cycloalkylmethyl, cycloalkylethyl or 2-(4-morpholinyl)ethyl." While this indeed would have 
8 Affidavit of Heather Reilly, Exhibit 1. 
9 Defendant's Exhibit 2. 




























made the language broader, including it does not make the language of the entire statute 
narrower. It simply makes narrower the list of examples given by the legislature of the type of 
substances being added to the list. The minutes of the legislative committees also make clear 
that the purpose behind the legislation is the banning of categories of substances, not just 
particular compounds. 
The Court finds that the Idaho legislature unambiguously intended to add synthetic 
imitators of marijuana to Schedule I and it did so in broad language that encompasses AM-2201. 
The contrary conclusion is reached only by ignoring the portion of the statute which indicates the 
specific formulations are given by way of example. It was the intent of the legislature to not deal 
with the so-called "spice" problem by constantly amending the statute as new analogs for THC 
are developed or discovered in the scientific literature by purveyors of mind altering substances. 
2. Is J.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii) unconstitutionallv vague? 
(a) Legal standards. 
A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute "bears the burden of establishing that 
the statute is unconstitutional and 'must overcome a strong presumption of validity."' State v. 
Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003) (citing Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 
Idaho 706, 709, 791P.2d1285, 1288 (1990). Under both the U.S. Constitution and Idaho 
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intended to prohibit and punish; otherwise it is void for uncertainty." City of Lewiston v. 
Mathewson, 78 Idaho 347, 350, 303 P.2d 680, 682 (1956). "The void-for-vagueness doctrine is 
premised upon the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." 
State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711-12, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003) (holding that provision in 
Idaho's trespass statute was not unconstitutionally void for vagueness under applied vagueness 
analysis). It "requires that a statute defining criminal conduct be worded with sufficient clarity 
and definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and that the 
statute be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Id. 
(citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982)). "It 
is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness ifits prohibitions are 
not clearly defined." Id. (citing Graynedv. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)). Due process 
also provides that "no one may be required at the peril ofloss of liberty to speculate as to the 
meaning of penal statutes." Id. (citations omitted). 
As such, the Idaho Supreme Court "has held that due process requires that all 'be 
informed as to what the State commands or forbids' and that 'men of common intelligence' not 
be forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law." Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132 
(citing State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 969 P.2d 244 (1998), Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 
(1974)). "A statute may be void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of 
ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes ... or if it fails to establish minimal 
guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute." Id. (citations 
omitted). "A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a 
defendant's conduct." Id. 




























In a facial challenge of vagueness, ''the complainant must demonstrate that the law is 
impermissibly vague in all of its applications," such that there are no circumstances where it is 
constitutional. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132 (citing Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 
497) (reiterating that "the challenger must show that the enactment is invalid in toto"). In an 
applied challenge, "a complainant must show that the statute, as applied to the defendant's 
conduct, failed to provide fair notice that the defendant's conduct was proscribed or failed to 
provide sufficient guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion in determining whether 
to arrest him." Id. A facial challenge and applied challenge are mutually exclusive. Id. 
(b) Arguments of the parties 
The Defendants do not expressly mount a facially unconstitutional challenge, but use 
langue in their arguments that could be construed as suggesting the statute is unconstitutional on 
its face. 10 
Defendants argue that LC. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague because a 
person of common intelligence cannot determine what conduct is being prohibited and 
ambiguities exist that open the door to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the act. 
Defendant asserts that J.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) must necessarily be of a highly technical nature and 
therefore very specific as to its meaning and application. Idaho House Bill 139 instead created 
confusion and uncertainty as to the meaning of I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) according to Defendants. 
This is demonstrated by the disagreement between the parties' experts as to whether AM-2201 is 
covered by the statute within subsection§ 37-2705(d)(30)(ii). As such, a person of common 
10 The Defendants' brief is somewhat short on law and long on argument. The Defendants do not make explicit 
whether the challenge is based on the language of the statute alone or as applied. The cases cited by Defendants do 
not make the distinction. 




























experience could not be expected to know of the statute's application to AM-2201. Defendant 
points out that most people in the U.S. population could not know whether they were possessing 
a chemical potentially covered by 2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) without first seeking professional input. 
Defendants note that Dr. Parent's services were obtained in order to remain compliant 
with the law. They claim was only because Dr. Parent concluded that AM-2201 was not covered 
that the manufacturers and retailers switched to the chemical. Defendant also point out that Utah 
passed its own law in which the legislature named numerous chemicals that were banned, but 
that Idaho instead decided to describe the chemicals. Thus, Defendants argue that, because is 
only one chemical by the name AM-2201, the legislature should have simply named AM-2201 as 
an illegal substance rather than describe potential chemical structures. 
Ultimately, Defendants suggest that the only way for the State to constitutionally regulate 
drugs is through legislation specifically naming individual chemicals. Defendants recognize that 
the state never likely be able to make the list long enough to capture all of the potential chemicals 
that can be abused. 11 Defendants theorize it is not possible use a description other than 
substance by substance to ban chemicals without the statute suffering from unconstitutional 
vagueness and over-breadth. 
The State sets forth that the statute provides actual notice and enforcement guidelines 
sufficient to satisfy due process standards. The State argues that the statute sufficiently informs a 
person of common intelligence that AM-2201 and similar types of synthetic drugs are illegal. 
The State also asserts that Defendants understood the legislation based on their attempt to 
circumvent the law by relying on a chemist to recommend a substitute substance and the 
11 In fact it appears Defendants are counting on this to stay in business in the future. 




























maintaining of a clandestine operation. The State characterizes Defendant's production of AM-
2201 as a calculated risk based on the erroneous belief that the legislature could not ban AM-
2201 without specifically naming it. 
The State disagrees with the argument that the statute is vague because of its technical 
nature. This would yield absurd results by invalidating all statutes requiring specialized 
legislation or using specialized terminology where a defendant can locate an expert to disagree. 
The State also notes that scientific or technical terms of art in a regulated field do not 
automatically render a statute unconstitutional. See Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 348 
(1918). The State points out that the Defendant concedes that the description in I.C. § 37-
2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) "intentionally covers thousands of potential chemicals," and the State asserts 
that Defendant and his counsel were well aware of the highly publicized rise of synthetic drug 
use in Idaho such as "spice." 
The State also notes that Defendant Alley's s counsel participated extensively in 
committee hearings in opposition to enactment of the law by attempting to dissuade lawmakers 
from prohibiting designer drugs, including cannabinoids. The Court does not find this argument 
on point. While counsel may have been representing Mr. Alley at the time of counsel's 
appearance before the legislature, there is no evidence to that effect in the record. 
In an abundance of caution, given the Defendants' overall lack of specificity of the nature 
of the challenge being mounted, the State, in its brief, discussed enforcement guidelines as they 
pertain to vagueness challenges to a statute. Defendants did not brief the issue. At the hearing 
Defendants stated the issue was not briefed because Defendants were lacking evidence to support 
the challenge on an "as applied basis." At the hearing, Defendants sought to interject the issue 




























into the case through recently obtained preliminary hearing transcripts. The Court declined to 
allow this evidence which apparently concerned events involving pending criminal cases in 
eastern Idaho. The exclusion was discretionary and based on the late disclosure to the State. The 
Court will not discuss it further. 
(c) Discussion 
To the extent the Defendants are making an argument that the statute is facially overbroad 
(see footnote No. 10, above), the argument must fail. The answer is in the testimony of 
Defendant's experts. The essence of a facial challenge is that the complainant must demonstrate 
that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications, such that there are no circumstances 
where it is constitutional. Here all three of Defendant's experts agree that JWH-210 and JWH-
019 are unambiguously described by the statute. This is obviously a circumstance where the 
State has banned a substance and there is no confusion over whether it is banned. Defendants do 
not claim they were confused over the legality of these substances. 
Ultimately, the Defendants' arguments are all based on the same faulty premise-that § 
37-2705( d)(30)(ii) is a stand-alone statute. That sub-sub-subsection of the statue is part of a 
larger statute as discussed above. That discussion will not be repeated here. In drawing the 
conclusion that AM-2201 is a legal substance, Defendant's experts focused on whether the 
particular substance was described by the isolated subsection rather than on the proper question 
of whether the substance is "synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant, or in 
the. resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, and their 
isomers with similar chemical structure ... " In lay terms, is this substance a synthetic 
cannabinoid? 




























The following is taken from a website cited by Dr. McDougal in Exhibit 2: 
AM-2201 -A Hyperpotent Halogenated Unintended Consequence 
With the recent legal issues surrounding certain synthetic cannabinoids in the 
United States, the market has changed 
The effects of AM-2201 also appear to differ from natural cannabis and the first 
generation synthetic cannabinoids, both to start and as tolerance builds. Initially 
the effects are quite similar, although doses for AM-2201 are approximately a 
third of JWH-018. This has resulted in many reports of self-reported "seasoned" 
synthetic cannabinoid users having anxiety reactions as a result of apparent 
overdose due to increased sensitivity to inaccurate measurement. Tolerance builds 
quickly, and frequent users have reported psychedelic-style effects typically 
previously only associated with high-dose oral consumption of marijuana. 
<http://countyourculture.com/2011/0l/12/am-2201-a-hyperpotent-halogenated-
unintended-consequence/ >last accessed April 5, 2012. 
There is a link to comments on the same page that contain a series of commentary on AM-2201 
that can only lead to the conclusion the posters are discussing a marijuana substitute. 12 
Wikipedia, the seeming source of information of choice by the general population, contains the 
following under the entry discussing Cannabinoid: 
Synthetic cannabinoids encompass a variety of distinct chemical classes: the 
classical cannabinoids structurally related to THC, the nonclassical cannabinoids 
( cannabimimetics) including the aminoalkylindoles, 1,5-diarylpyrazoles, 
quinolines, and arylsulphonamides, as well as eicosanoids related to the 
endocannabinoids. 
12 A sample: 
DailyToker REPL y I QUOTE 
December 3rd, 2011 
Well I make and sell herbal incense, AM-2201 is the active ingredient in my company's product. 
I add lg of AM to 30g of Marshmallow leaf, and it last me about 10 days or so. 
I have been using AM220 l for over a year now and have not noticed any ill effects .. .its just like smoking weed to 
me. 
I guess everyone reacts differently. 
<htt.p://cou.gtyourculture. com/20 l l/01/J2/am-2201-a-hyperpotent-halogenated-unintended-conseguence/#comroents 
>last accessed April 5, 2012 



























Other notable synthetic cannabinoids include: 
AM-2201, a potent cannabinoid receptor agonist. 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synthetic cannabinoid#Synthetic and patented ca 
nnabinoids > last accessed April 5, 2012. 
If this weren't enough, one has only to look at the name AM-2201. The name was given to the 
chemical by its inventor. Mr. Alley is apparently engaged in the business of marketing synthetic 
cannabinoids. 13 Assuming, based on his counsel's argument, that someone such as Mr. Alley 
went looking for information to determine the nature of AM-2201, it does not great effort or 
ingenuity to get from the Wikipedia entry on AM-2201 to the patent. 14 Footnote No. 1 in the 
Wikipedia article is a link to the patent. The patent makes clear that AM-2201 intended to 
mimic marijuana. It was specifically invented in the hope of discovering a compound that could 
be used in medical research in place of marijuana. See Exhibits 111 and 112. 
There is no real ambiguity or uncertainty over the nature of AM-2201. Nor is the statute 
vague or incapable of being understood by a person of ordinary intelligence. The Defendants are 
of the mistaken impression that it is somehow improper for the legislature to outlaw "thousands 
of compounds." Defendant's claimed ambiguity only exists because Defendant's asked their 
13 Mr. Alley did not testify and not submit any affidavit in support of the motion. His counsel argued that Mr. Alley 
and the other Defendants were assiduously attempting to follow the law and were attempting to find a legal substance 
to market in light of the actions of the Board of Pharmacy and the legislature. He suggested by argument that Mr. 
Alley is merely a businessman doing his best to make his way in the world , but there is no evidence in the record 
that any Defendant, including Mr. Alley, took any particular action. Dr. Parent's letter was addressed to Counsel and 
there is no evidence that any Defendant relied on Dr. Parent's opinion in any way. 
14 Cj. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 501, 102S.Ct.1186 (1982) 
holding that the technical tenn "roach clip" has sufficiently clear meaning in the drug paraphernalia industry such 
that, without undue burden, the defendant could easily determine the meaning of the term, citing dictionaries 
defining "roach." 




























experts the wrong question. Rather than ask whether AM-2201 is described in LC. §37-
2705(d)(30)(ii)(a), they should have asked the experts whether AM-2201 is a synthetic 
cannabinoid. If they had asked that question, the answer would no doubt have been "yes." 
CONCLUSION 
AM-2201 is a schedule one substance. This is so whether or not it is specifically 
described in LC. §37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a). It is on Schedule I because it is a "synthetic equivalent 
of the substances contained in the plant, or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or 
synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure." 
Idaho Code §37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) is not unconstitutionally vague nor are the 2011 
amendments to Idaho Code §37-2705 applicable here. The Idaho Legislature intended to outlaw 
synthetic marijuana and it did so in terms such that a person of ordinary intelligence is on notice 
of the conduct prohibited. 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 9th day of April, 2012, nunc J!.ro tune this 6th da:>,; 
eenwood 
istrict Judge 
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